In Baranowicz v. Commissioner, No. 04-71327 (9th Cir. 12/23/05), the Ninth Circuit held that an ex-husband lacked standing to appeal his former wife’s grant of innocent spouse relief:

In Estate of Ravetti, [37 F.3d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir. 1994),] we held that a non-requesting spouse did not have standing to challenge the tax court’s determination that his spouse was entitled to relief under § 6013(e). We explained that the petitioner suffered no injury that could be redressed on appeal because he was liable for the full deficiency regardless of whether his spouse was granted relief under the “innocent spouse” provision. Id. We reasoned that the nature of joint and several liability was such that our determination would not affect the petitioner’s tax liability, and “the only harm would be to the IRS, in depriving it of an additional source from which to recover.” Id. at 1395….

The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (the “Restructuring Act”), however, specifically added a provision to I.R.C. § 6015 requiring that the non-requesting spouse be given “adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party to [innocent spouse] proceeding[s].” I.R.C. § 6015(e)(4). Therefore, we must re-examine the question presented in Estate of Ravetti in light of this statutory change made by the Restructuring Act….

Here, there is no evidence that Congress intended to create a new right granting a non-requesting spouse standing to appeal from the Tax Court’s adverse innocent spouse determination….Baranowicz cannot show that he has a sufficient tangible interest to support Article III standing because his tax liability would remain the same whether or not we were to affirm or reverse the Tax Court’s determination.

Absent a showing of some concrete harm, we must reject Baranowicz’s argument that the mere grant of participation rights in the Tax Court under § 6015(e)(4) is sufficient to confer on him standing to appeal.