George K. Yin (Virginia) presents Temporary-Effect Legislation and Fiscal Responsibility at NYU today as part of its Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance Series, moderated by Alan Auerbach & Daniel Shaviro. Here is part of the Introduction:

I argue that current legislative practices permit Congress to avoid the fiscal discipline intended by the budget process, but for a reason different from the one identified by most critics. In particular, I contend that the enactment of permanent legislation threatens greater fiscal responsibility, whereas increased use of temporary legislation (or its close cousin, “temporary-effect legislation,” which I define as legislation whose budget effect is of only a limited duration) actually facilitates such responsibility. Since any enacted legislation may be subsequently changed or repealed, the difference between permanent and temporary-effect legislation is simply the default rule applicable to the legislation’s duration: permanent legislation continues in effect until changed or terminated by Congressional action, whereas temporary-effect legislation expires unless extended by such action. Nevertheless, this difference is an important one in the legislative process, particularly in view of the budget accounting consequences described in this paper.