David I. Walker (Boston University) has published Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 927 (2007).  Here is the abstract:

The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is underappreciated. Advocates ofpositive accounting theory have argued that even cosmetic changes in reported earnings can affect share value, not because market participants are unable to see through such changes to the underlying fundamentals, but because of implicit or explicit contracts that are based on reported earnings and transaction costs. However, agency theory suggests that accounting choices and corporate responses to accounting standard changes will not necessarily be those that maximize share value. For a number ofreasons, including the fact that executive compensation is often tied to reported earnings, managerial preferences for high earnings generally will exceed shareholder preferences, leading to share value reducing tradeoffs between reported earnings and net cashflows. Empirical evidence supporting the detailedpredictions ofthese theories is mixed, but the evidence jirmly establishes the power ofaccounting to shape corporate behavior.

The power of accounting and the divergence of interests have many implications for courts and policy makers. For example, consideration of proposals to increase conformity between tax andfinancial accounting rules as a means ofcombating tax sheltering and/or artificialearnings inflation must take into account the incentive properties of accounting standards and recognize that narrowing the gap between tax and book income will have economic consequences however the gap is narrowed. This Article considers this and other implications of the behavioral effects ofaccounting standards, including the possibility ofsetting accounting standards instrumentally as a means ofregulating corporate behavior, an alternative to tax incentives, mandates, or direct subsidies.