The Florida Tax Review has published the papers from its Third Annual International Taxation Symposium:

• Ruth Mason (Connecticut), Common Markets, Common Tax Problems, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 599 (2007). Here is the Conclusion:

George Washington’s particular vision of a United States of Europe similar to the United States of America that would legislate for all the nationalities of Europe has not come to pass. However, while it is important to be mindful of the vast differences in both government structure and fiscal systems in the United States and the European Union, a tour of some of the tax problems common to both jurisdictions suggests that tax policy-makers in each jurisdiction may benefit from examining approaches taken in the other. In particular, the nature of the debates in Europe and the United States over the future of state taxation are similar in that they acknowledge a tension between the benefits of greater tax harmonization, including efficiency, simplicity and reducing opportunities for tax avoidance, and the benefits of state tax autonomy, including flexibility, responsiveness, experimentation, and fiscal discipline.

• Joanne Weiner (Adjunct Professor, George Washington), Practical Aspects of Implementing Formulary Apportionment in the European Union, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 629 (2007). Here is the Conclusion:

The growing economic integration in the European Union has led the European Commission to suggest that the EU Member States re-consider how they tax multinational enterprises. Specifically, the EU Commission would like to give multinational enterprises the opportunity to calculate a common consolidated corporate tax base at the EU level and use a common formula to distribute the single tax base to the Member States for taxation at local rates.

Using a formula to distribute income to the Member States does not eliminate Member States tax sovereignty. To the contrary, the local tax rate remains a highly effective fiscal tool even within a system with a common formula and common tax base. As long as the Member States are able to set their own tax rates, they will be able to remain competitive in the drive to stimulate new investment and employment. The European Commission has set forth an ambitious schedule for 2008. To achieve its goal of making a legislative proposal, it must define taxable income, the consolidated group, the apportionment formula, and the definition of the EU’s territorial boundaries. Whether the Commission can achieve this goal or not is uncertain. The Member States may not have the political will to create a common consolidated tax base with formulary apportionment in the European Union. Whether the Commission should aim for this goal is not in question. Despite some technical and political difficulties, a common consolidated corporate tax base with formulary apportionment appears to be the best way to tax multinational companies in the European Union.

• Jinyang Li (Osgoode Hall) has published The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 669 (2007).   Here is the Introduction:

China had no foreign direct investment (FDI) before 1979. Now, it is one of the world’s largest recipients of FDI. China has been generous to a fault in granting tax incentives to foreign investors. As of January 1, 2008, however, these FDI-specific incentives will be abolished or phased out. What explains the rise and fall? Were the tax incentives not effective in attracting FDI and promoting China’s economic growth? What are the implications of the Chinese experience for international tax debates? This article examines these questions.

Part II of the Article provides an overview of the Chinese tax incentive regimes for FDI. It briefly discusses the creation, expansion, and termination of tax incentives and the key motivations at each stage. Part III evaluates these incentives in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency and fairness. Effectiveness is examined on the basis of general data about FDI growth in China and empirical research on investors’ reactions to Chinese tax incentives. The economic efficiency of tax incentives is assessed by looking at the positive externalities of FDI in China, the un-intended distortions to investment behaviour, and the extent to which the incentives lead to tax discrimination against local business. The equity aspect of tax incentives is assessed in terms of the role of tax policy in achieving redistributive justice in China. Part IV explores the implications of the Chinese experience for the debate on the use of tax policy in attracting FDI, harmful tax competition and international redistribution. Part V concludes the paper.