Columbia hosts day 2 of its tax policy conference today (program): 

David Kamin (NYU), Distribution Reimagined 
Discussant: Natasha Sarin (Yale; Google Scholar)

Policymakers are considering enacting either a new spending program or a tax cut. Who pays for the policy? The answer to that question is central to understanding the consequences. Yet, it is a question which, for the most part, policy analysts and scholars have left under-explored and often answered incorrectly or at least incompletely. Analysts and scholars have approached the issue in a variety of ways including simply believing what policymakers say is the financing in a given piece of legislation or, alternatively, assuming the financing is “distributionally neutral” — offsetting any distributional effects of the benefit given. These approaches are wrong and fail to capture the actual financing. This article suggests an alternative: causal analysis rooted in the political economy of the government. It is distribution reimagined. This article begins to explore what it means to analyze financing as a causal matter. Importantly, there will be no certainty in this endeavor—it is necessarily probabilistic and should take into account the inconsistency of policymakers over time.

The approach can fundamentally change our understanding of the distribution of policy. Policies that seem more progressive may be exactly the opposite. And, it can lead to a re evaluation of the wisdom of policy. Given the political economy of the United States, new benefits could be financed to a significant degree by those with lower incomes, despite what policymakers may say at the time. If policymakers continue to be averse to the types of financing sources that reduce this risk, it suggests greater reason to keep fiscal benefits targeted on those with greater need. In the end, irrespective of one’s policy preferences, this type of causal analysis is critical to understanding the effects and wisdom of fiscal policies.

Adam Kern (San Diego; Google Scholar), A Guide to the Global Minimum Tax
Discussant: Wei Cui (University of British Columbia; Google Scholar) 

The global minimum tax is often praised for its promise to restrain harmful tax competition. But the effects of the global minimum tax are more nuanced than is commonly understood. This Article shows that the global minimum tax raises a trade-off between two kinds of tax competition: competition for profit and competition for investment. It also provides suggestive evidence that the costs of intensifying competition for investment could be substantial. Specific reforms are proposed that could preserve the benefits of the global minimum tax while mitigating its harms.

Michael Love (Columbia; Google Scholar), Taxing Complexity 
Discussant: Jacob Goldin (Chicago; Google Scholar)

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