My posts on law professors’ using Generative AI to compose law review articles (first one here, second one here) continue to generate interesting responses. Which, of course, is part of my goal: I blog to learn.

Today’s addition: Michael L. Smith (Oklahoma Law), “Generative AI and the Purpose of Legal Scholarship” (forthcoming, U. Mass. L. Rev.). Professor Smith is skeptical. The abstract:

What does generative AI mean for the future of legal scholarship? The topic has been the talk of the town around academic water coolers. Some legal scholars have tried their hand at generating legal scholarship using generative AI. The accompanying commentary is varied, but advocates for the technology suggest that generative AI may become a common tool for legal scholars, leaving those who refuse to adapt at a severe disadvantage.

In this article, I contemplate a world in which legal scholars routinely use generative AI to produce academic writing. I argue that an instrumental view of legal scholarship’s value—a view dominated by an obsession with quantity, citations, and prestige hierarchies—obscures the detrimental effects that generative AI may have on the intrinsic value of writing and publishing. A deeper look at the fundamental purposes of legal scholarship suggests that generative AI poses far more of a danger than a purely instrumental perspective suggests. Intrinsic benefits derived from the tedious, time-intensive task of academic legal writing include developing knowledge, collaborating with colleagues, improving one’s writing and communication, and having fun. Generative AI threatens to reduce or eliminate these valuable aspects of legal scholarship in favor of speed, efficiency, and quantity. I illustrate this point using typical law-review-style argumentation supplemented with speculative fiction, narrative, ChatGPT parody, and the occasional footnote joke.