Christina Fong (Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Social and Decision Sciences) presents Strong Reciprocity and the Welfare State (with Samuel Bowles (University of Sienna & Santa Fe Institute) & Herbert Gintis (Columbia University & Santa Fe Institute) at NYU today as part of its Colloquium Series on Tax Policy and Public Finance, moderated by Alan Auerbach & Daniel Shaviro.  Here is the abstract:

We explore the contribution of reciprocity and other non-selfish motives to the political viability of the modern welfare state. In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the electorate.  Economists have for the most part misunderstood this process due to their endorsement of an empirically implausible theory of selfish human motivation. Drawing on anthropological, experimental, public opinion survey and other data we develop an alternative behavioral explanation for economic reasoning about sharing and insurance. In this alternative view, reciprocity motives are necessary for understanding support for and opposition to the welfare state. Modern citizens willingly share with those who uphold societal norms about what constitutes morally worthy behavior, while frequently seeking to punish those who transgress those norms, even when these actions are individually costly and yield no individual material benefit.