Kose John (NYU, Department of Finance), Vinay B. Nair (Penn, Wharton School) & Lemma W. Senbet (Maryland, Robert H. Smith School of Business) have posted Law, Organizational Form and Taxes: A Stakeholder Perspective on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In a setting where corporate investment imposes positive and negative externalities, the social impact of corporations depends on the sharing rule between the owners of a corporation and the non-financial claimants. We examine the role of law and organizational form in altering this sharing rule. Since the legal regime affects the extent to which corporate owners are held responsible for the negative externalities they impose, unlimited liability may discourage investment in strong legal regimes. Limited liability, however, might be accompanied by excessive investment. We highlight the role of the government in altering the sharing rule due to its claim through corporate taxation and investigate the relation between law and corporate taxation. We find that corporate tax rates are a decreasing function of legal strength. Finally, we document supporting evidence using cross-country data.