a surfer in front of the malibu pier on a sunny day

Paul L. Caron
Dean
Pepperdine Caruso
School of Law

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  • Estate Planning for Pets

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Interesting story via TaxGuru about a Charlton, NY widow who left $500,000 at her death to care for her pets: a horse, a dog, and 2 cats. Now, 8 years later, only 1 cat (“Teddy Bear”) is alive and lives in the family home along with a caretaker (cattaker?) hired by a local trust company. Interestingly, no one has ever seen the cat, but a neighbor claims “the cat has a special tattoo to prevent anyone from replacing him with a look-alike when he dies.” (Oh, oh: cat tattoos: can PETA be far behind?) Enterprising reporters have not been able to see the cat either. According to the will, when the cat dies the property is to be rented out on a year-by-year basis with the proceeds going to a local animal welfare organization. Check out the article.

  • Gerzog on Annuity Tables and Ithaca Trust

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Wendy Gerzog (Baltimore) has posted Annuity Tables Versus Factually-Based Estate Tax Valuation: Ithaca Trust Revisited on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

    This Article discusses Ithaca Trust and that case’s emphasis on the integrity of actuarial tables for estate tax valuation purposes. The author argues that application of actuarial table values for estate tax valuation is the best means to value estates where use of tables is mandated, despite recent decisions that have allowed admission of facts to alter the valuation of property where actuarial table values should have applied.

  • Bankman Colloquium on Tax Compliance Costs at NYU

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Joe Bankman (Stanford) presents Should the Government Bear (Some) Tax Compliance Costs? at the NYU Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance. Here are excerpts from the introduction to the paper:

    “Regulation is expensive. The federal income tax comprises one of the most extensive forms of government regulation and one of the most expensive. Much of this expense is recognized in the form of reduced work effort or saving, or tax-driven decisions among types of work or savings. Economic models that evaluate fundamental tax reform proposals often focus exclusively on these two forms of tax-induced changes in behavior, ignoring compliance costs. These costs, however, are quite significant. They include the time spent filing one’s tax return and maintaining records related to that filing; the time spent learning and negotiating the rules when engaged in various forms of tax planning; and the amounts paid to third parties, such as accountants, lawyers, financial planners or software providers, to that same end. They also include the costs the government incurs to promulgate and enforce the law.

    Compliance costs associated with the individual income tax are estimated to comprise about 10% of revenue raised from the tax, or about $100 billion a year. In at least one respect, these compliance costs understate the burden, since they do not attempt to put a cost figure on the anxiety many taxpayers feel when filing their return. Compliance costs substantially reduce the social gains from taxation; in some areas, these costs may outweigh those gains altogether.

    This paper examines the question ‘Who should bear individual income tax compliance costs?’ The question is important for a number of reasons. First, many voters believe that those responsible for the tax law do not accurately reflect constituent needs, and that as a result the government does not adequately take taxpayer compliance costs into account when designing tax rules…. Second, some compliance costs fall disproportionately upon a small group of taxpayers…. Third, and more generally, many compliance costs are variable, and it may be efficient to require those costs be borne by one party or another. Finally, compliance costs reduce the social value of regulation in fields other than tax, and it may be possible to extend the analysis here to those other fields.

    Part I introduces the subject and analysis with an example that provides probably the strongest case for government reimbursement of compliance costs: taxpayer compliance management program (‘TCMP’) or TCMP-like audits….

    Part II sets forth a preliminary analytical framework with which to view compliance costs. Part II.A. examines the special case in which voter preferences are flawlessly translated into law and procedure…. Part II.B. assumes that government officials maximize values other than (or possibly in addition to) those they impute to voters and do not adequately weight compliance costs; and that those costs would receive greater weight if they were treated as a separate budget item…. Part II.C. assumes that the IRS is well intentioned but impolitic; that the legislature and/or electorate wrongly believes that the agency does not adequately weigh compliance costs when setting policy and so sets undesirable constraints on agency behavior….

    Part III briefly discusses one area in which the government does absorb taxpayer compliance costs. Section 7430 provides limited reimbursement for certain costs incurred in challenging an IRS determination or collection.

    Part IV uses the analytical framework in Part II to analyze two significant forms of taxpayer compliance costs: the costs of garden-variety audits and the costs of filing individual tax returns. The argument for a rimbursement system for garden-variety audit is similar to the argument for reimbursement for TCMP-style audits. However, a garden-variety audit reimbursement system poses additional difficulties, and is certain to be more expensive to maintain. A reimbursement system for filing costs is attractive only under a very constrained and unrealistic set of assumptions.”

  • Bush-Cheney Tax Returns and Athenian Democracy

    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    David Cay Johnston has a nice piece today in the NY Times on how the 2003 Bush and Cheney tax returns “demonstrate how far American tax policy has veered from two classic philosophical insights about how to finance government: ‘horizontal equity’ and ‘vertical equity.’” In her article, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, Maureen Cavanaugh (Washington & Lee) observed that “Athenian democracy, with its complete commitment to political equality, allocated its tax burden to the wealthy and exempted ordinary citizens from tax, an exemption largely responsible for incorporation of ordinary (i.e., non-wealthy) citizens in democratic government.” In the NY Times piece, Cavanaugh notes that the Bush-Cheney tax returns reflect a shift away from the ability-to-pay ideal. Johnston concludes that “One thing’s for sure: Judging from the Cheney and Bush returns, we’ve come a long way indeed from the classic tax policies of ancient Greece.”

  • IRS Says “Bling Bling” Not Deductible

    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    The Watley Review, which describes itself as being “dedicated to the production of articles completely without journalistic merit or factual basis,” reports in its latest issue that the IRS will not allow taxpayers to deduct the cost of “bling bling” — diamonds, jewelry, and related showy paraphernelia.

  • Top 5 Tax Paper Downloads

    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    The Social Science Research Network compiles a list of the most frequently downloaded tax papers over a rolling two-month period. Here are the Top 5 tax downloads from this week’s Top 10 list:

    1. Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, by Reuven Avi-Yonah (Michigan)

    2. The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, by Steven Bank (UCLA)

    3. Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for Reform by David Schizer (Columbia)

    4. The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, by Michael Knoll (Pennsylvania)

    5. The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited by Steven Bank (UCLA)

  • More on Kerry’s 2003 Tax Return

    Saturday, April 17, 2004

    Jack Bodganski (Lewis & Clark) has a nice discussion on his blog of Kerry’s 2003 tax return. This follows up on the earlier discussion here as well as on InstaPundit. For further Kerry tax discussion, see here, here, and here. Thanks to Bob McCombs for the leads.

  • TaxProf Blog Debuts on InstaPundit

    Saturday, April 17, 2004

    TaxProf Blog debuted on InstaPundit today on John Kerry’s 2003 tax return, noting how the curious $85 deduction for non-monetary donations to Goodwill on page 25 of the return:

    “raises an interesting parallel to Clinton’s tax returns he released when he first ran for President. Remember how he got excoriated for deducting various clothing items donated to Goodwill, including, most famously, used underwear? . . . Kerry deducted $85 for a Goodwill donation! Enquiring minds want to know: what was it Sen. Kerry? Underwear? Military Medals?”

  • Kahn on Estate Tax Apportionment Act

    Saturday, April 17, 2004

    Douglas Kahn (Michigan) has posted The 2003 Revised Uniform Estate Tax Aportionment Act on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

    This Article describes the significant sections of the 2003 Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act (the “2003 Uniform Act”). The Article explains the purpose and operation of the 2003 Uniform Act’s various sections and notes some of the differences between the 2003 Uniform Act and its prior version.

  • Warren on Taxation of Options On Issuer’s Stock

    Saturday, April 17, 2004

    Alvin Warren (Harvard) has posted Taxation of Options on Issuer’s Stock on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

    This paper reconsiders the tax policy question of whether gains and losses on options on the issuer’s stock should be excluded from the corporate tax base. The principal conclusions are that nonrecognition provisions of current law are problematic, and that the appropriate legislative response depends on a range of considerations, including the function of the corporate tax and the appropriate treatment of employee stock options.

    Part I briefly reviews the principal provisions of current law and identifies the role of the corporate tax that provides the tentative normative perspective of the paper. Part II illustrates the inconsistent taxation under present law of options and certain substantially equivalent transactions. Part III examines some combinations of options and substantially equivalent transactions. Part IV considers alternatives to the 1984 legislation. Part V provides a summary of conclusions

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