a surfer in front of the malibu pier on a sunny day

Paul L. Caron
Dean
Pepperdine Caruso
School of Law

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  • What Tax Profs Are Reading . . . Newman on Perfectly Legal

    Tuesday, April 20, 2004

    Joel Newman (Wake Forest) kicks off a new feature of TaxProf Blog: What Tax Profs Are Reading. The goal is to share with the broader tax community reviews of both tax-related and nontax-related books recently read by tax professors. We invite tax professors to submit reviews of books they are reading.

    Here is Prof. Newman’s take on Perfectly Legal by New York Times tax reporter David Cay Johnston:

    Book Cover Life isn’t fair. We don’t all have an equal chance to win a footrace; people who can run the fastest tend to win. We all know that, and most of us accept it, provided that the process is fair. For example, it helps if all the racers are required to begin at the same starting line.

    In his new book, Perfectly Legal, David Cay Johnston says that the game is rigged, and that our tax laws are at least partly to blame. The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. Recent tax changes lighten the load on the richest Americans, and pay for the shortfall by increasing the social security tax, which largely falls upon the middle class.

    IRS enforcement trends don’t help. It has always been easier for the IRS to track wages—the income of the lower and middle classes, than to track the non-wage income earned by the richest Americans. Congress only made things worse by handcuffing the IRS, and cutting its budget to boot. Ironically, the only people who are experiencing increased IRS audit rates are the low-income taxpayers who try to navigate the complex and badly drafted Earned Income Tax Credit. Surely, even the IRS knows that that’s not where the money is.

    Who is to blame? Much of the problem is structural. Law reflects its environment. One would surely expect US tax law, which reflects one of the largest, sophisticated, and complex economies the world has ever known, to be complex.

    Further, our democratic process is unwieldy at best. Members of Congress do what they need to do to get reelected. It is rarely worth their time to get heavily involved in understanding, no less reforming, the tax laws, when the most likely result of their efforts would be to make them far more enemies than friends.

    What’s more, the richest among us get to hire the best tax advisors. Moreover, only the rich are flexible enough to take their advice. Poor people have no choice about how to spend their money—they have barely enough as it is. Only the rich can shift their money around from one investment to another, to maximize tax savings. Of course our tax laws are most easily manipulated by the rich. Why should they be any different from our other laws?

    To his credit, Johnston blames both Democrats and Republicans. Both share in the lack of understanding and guts which makes all of this possible. However, the Republicans, who have been in power most recently, are clearly responsible for the most recent debacles. It is they who rail against the federal estate taxes (which they call the “death tax” after consultation with their ad men and focus groups), after making claims against it which, as Johnston shows, absolutely cannot stand up.

    Remember, a race can’t be fair unless everyone starts at the same place. Even with the estate tax in place, rich parents can give their children an enormous leg up on the competition in the next generation. Do we really want to eliminate the estate tax and make that potential competitive advantage even bigger?

    David Cay Johnston is the best newspaper reporter on the tax beat. His book is entertaining and instructive. He does a marvelous job of simplifying complex things, including reincorporation in Bermuda, the out-of-control alternative minimum tax, and the excesses of corporate jets. On that last issue, if both the liberal Howard Metzenbaum and the conservative Jesse Helms agree that we have a problem, then we definitely have a problem. Also, he humanizes the story by focusing on the real people involved, from the IRS Commissioner to some of our best tax lawyers, to some of our most interesting taxpayers.

    Johnston says that our tax code needs more than mere tinkering; it needs major overhaul. But which overhaul, and how? Perhaps we should shift the emphasis from taxing income to taxing consumption. Surely, we should reconsider how we tax international transactions. There is no doubt that we need to strengthen, and fund, the IRS, so that it can do its job fairly.

    Whatever changes we make, however, we must make them openly. Our tax laws are hugely important. The people of the United States need to understand them well enough to participate in a national conversation about what they do, and how they might be changed. Perfectly Legal is a wonderful first step toward that understanding.

  • Burke on Exculpatory Liabilities and Partnership Allocations

    Tuesday, April 20, 2004

    Karen Burke (San Diego) has posted Exculpatory Liabilities and Nonrecourse Partnership Allocations on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

    The rise of limited liability companies (LLCs) classified as partnerships for federal income tax purposes challenges traditional assumptions concerning the treatment of recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under Subchapter K. The complex rules of sections 704(b) and 752 give little attention to liabilities that are recourse to the entity under section 1001 but for which no member bears the economic risk of loss under section 752. In comparison to traditional general or limited partnerships, however, LLCs are much more likely to incur such “exculpatory” liabilities because of the limited liability shield under state law. Under the existing regulations for section 704(b) and 752 (the “section 704(b)/752 regulations”), the classification of liabilities as either recourse or nonrecourse is essential for purposes of allocating basis and deductions attributable to such liabilities. Although exculpatory liabilities are functionally quite similar to traditional nonrecourse liabilities secured by all of an LLC’s assets, literal application of the section 704(b)/752 regulations with respect to such liabilities is fraught with difficulties.

    Under these regulations, the allocation of tax items attributable to nonrecourse liabilities is extraordinarily permissive: since no partner bears the economic risk of loss attributable to such liabilities, the corresponding deductions may be allocated in virtually any manner the parties desire. Upon disposition of the underlying property, however, the partners who received such deductions must be allocated offsetting gain and income to restore any capital account deficits, thereby vindicating the earlier loss allocations. The underlying premise of the nonrecourse allocation rules is that it is possible to identify the partnership’s nonrecourse liabilities and track the deductions generated by such liabilities for purposes of allocating the corresponding basis and losses. Because of their hybrid nature as recourse liabilities for purposes of section 1001 and nonrecourse liabilities for purposes of section 752, exculpatory liabilities challenge the basic premises of this somewhat oversimplified description of the nonrecourse allocation rules. Indeed, as two recent articles demonstrate, the uncertainty and lack of consensus concerning the treatment of exculpatory liabilities within the framework of the section 704(b)/752 regulations is quite remarkable.

    This article seeks to disentangle the treatment of exculpatory liabilities under the nonrecourse allocation rules and suggests several needed reforms. Part II concludes that an exculpatory liability should be treated similarly to a traditional nonrecourse liability for purposes of determining economic risk of loss upon a constructive liquidation. Part III argues that the mechanical provisions of the nonrecourse allocation rules can be properly applied to exculpatory liabilities once it is clearly understood that the nonrecourse standard of sections 704(b) and 752 diverges fundamentally from the nonrecourse standard of section 1001. Part IV discusses related problems that arise because exculpatory liabilities are secured not by particular assets but rather by all of an LLC’s assets. Finally, Part V suggests that the section 704(b) regulations should be amended to harmonize the treatment of guaranteed recourse liabilities of an LLC (or recourse loans from an LLC member) and functionally similar guaranteed nonrecourse liabilities of an LLC (or nonrecourse loans from an LLC member).

    While clarifying these issues is necessary to provide certainty in the tax treatment of exculpatory liabilities, this article also suggests the need to rethink the nonrecourse definition under sections 704(b), 752, and 1001. Upon a disposition of property encumbered by liabilities in excess of fair market value, the section 1001 regulations draw a distinction between recourse and nonrecourse liabilities; the latter generate section 1001 gain through relief from the underlying liability, while the former generate a combination of section 1001 gain (or loss) and ordinary income from discharge of indebtedness.10 Although the conceptual model underlying the section 704(b)/752 regulations is derived from section 1001 and Tufts v. Commissioner, the drafters failed to clearly articulate and rationalize the manner in which the nonrecourse allocation rules deviate from the section 1001 standard. Consequently, uncertainty persists concerning the precise boundaries between the nonrecourse definitions of sections 704(b), 752, and 1001. Ultimately, such uncertainty can be dispelled only if the section 704(b)/752 regulations construct a theory of nonrecourse allocations that is explicitly independent of the section 1001 standard.

  • Rasmussen Enters Kerry Tax Return Fray

    Tuesday, April 20, 2004

    Eric Rasmussen (Indiana-Bloomington) questions Sen. Kerry’s treatment of the 175k capital gain on the sale of a painting and the 89k of book royalties on his 2003 tax return.

  • More on Bush-Cheney-Kerry Tax Returns

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Jim Maule (Villanova) has an interesting take on the recently released Bush-Cheney-Kerry tax returns (recently blogged on TaxProf Blog here, here, here. here, and here). Maule compares their relative tax burdens as a percentage of AGI with some prior Presidents and finds no discernible pattern:

    Bush II (2002): 31.4%
    Cheney (2002): 29.2%
    Bush II (2003): 27.7%
    Carter (1977): 25.5%
    FDR (1935): 25.1%
    Clinton (1995): 23.9%
    Kerry (2003): 22.9%
    Cheney(2003): 20.0%
    Bush I (1991): 15.5%

    For the record, TaxProf Blog’s was 15.1% Not bad, huh? (Who said those that can, do; those who can’t, teach?)

  • Estate Planning for Pets

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Interesting story via TaxGuru about a Charlton, NY widow who left $500,000 at her death to care for her pets: a horse, a dog, and 2 cats. Now, 8 years later, only 1 cat (“Teddy Bear”) is alive and lives in the family home along with a caretaker (cattaker?) hired by a local trust company. Interestingly, no one has ever seen the cat, but a neighbor claims “the cat has a special tattoo to prevent anyone from replacing him with a look-alike when he dies.” (Oh, oh: cat tattoos: can PETA be far behind?) Enterprising reporters have not been able to see the cat either. According to the will, when the cat dies the property is to be rented out on a year-by-year basis with the proceeds going to a local animal welfare organization. Check out the article.

  • Gerzog on Annuity Tables and Ithaca Trust

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Wendy Gerzog (Baltimore) has posted Annuity Tables Versus Factually-Based Estate Tax Valuation: Ithaca Trust Revisited on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

    This Article discusses Ithaca Trust and that case’s emphasis on the integrity of actuarial tables for estate tax valuation purposes. The author argues that application of actuarial table values for estate tax valuation is the best means to value estates where use of tables is mandated, despite recent decisions that have allowed admission of facts to alter the valuation of property where actuarial table values should have applied.

  • Bankman Colloquium on Tax Compliance Costs at NYU

    Monday, April 19, 2004

    Joe Bankman (Stanford) presents Should the Government Bear (Some) Tax Compliance Costs? at the NYU Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance. Here are excerpts from the introduction to the paper:

    “Regulation is expensive. The federal income tax comprises one of the most extensive forms of government regulation and one of the most expensive. Much of this expense is recognized in the form of reduced work effort or saving, or tax-driven decisions among types of work or savings. Economic models that evaluate fundamental tax reform proposals often focus exclusively on these two forms of tax-induced changes in behavior, ignoring compliance costs. These costs, however, are quite significant. They include the time spent filing one’s tax return and maintaining records related to that filing; the time spent learning and negotiating the rules when engaged in various forms of tax planning; and the amounts paid to third parties, such as accountants, lawyers, financial planners or software providers, to that same end. They also include the costs the government incurs to promulgate and enforce the law.

    Compliance costs associated with the individual income tax are estimated to comprise about 10% of revenue raised from the tax, or about $100 billion a year. In at least one respect, these compliance costs understate the burden, since they do not attempt to put a cost figure on the anxiety many taxpayers feel when filing their return. Compliance costs substantially reduce the social gains from taxation; in some areas, these costs may outweigh those gains altogether.

    This paper examines the question ‘Who should bear individual income tax compliance costs?’ The question is important for a number of reasons. First, many voters believe that those responsible for the tax law do not accurately reflect constituent needs, and that as a result the government does not adequately take taxpayer compliance costs into account when designing tax rules…. Second, some compliance costs fall disproportionately upon a small group of taxpayers…. Third, and more generally, many compliance costs are variable, and it may be efficient to require those costs be borne by one party or another. Finally, compliance costs reduce the social value of regulation in fields other than tax, and it may be possible to extend the analysis here to those other fields.

    Part I introduces the subject and analysis with an example that provides probably the strongest case for government reimbursement of compliance costs: taxpayer compliance management program (‘TCMP’) or TCMP-like audits….

    Part II sets forth a preliminary analytical framework with which to view compliance costs. Part II.A. examines the special case in which voter preferences are flawlessly translated into law and procedure…. Part II.B. assumes that government officials maximize values other than (or possibly in addition to) those they impute to voters and do not adequately weight compliance costs; and that those costs would receive greater weight if they were treated as a separate budget item…. Part II.C. assumes that the IRS is well intentioned but impolitic; that the legislature and/or electorate wrongly believes that the agency does not adequately weigh compliance costs when setting policy and so sets undesirable constraints on agency behavior….

    Part III briefly discusses one area in which the government does absorb taxpayer compliance costs. Section 7430 provides limited reimbursement for certain costs incurred in challenging an IRS determination or collection.

    Part IV uses the analytical framework in Part II to analyze two significant forms of taxpayer compliance costs: the costs of garden-variety audits and the costs of filing individual tax returns. The argument for a rimbursement system for garden-variety audit is similar to the argument for reimbursement for TCMP-style audits. However, a garden-variety audit reimbursement system poses additional difficulties, and is certain to be more expensive to maintain. A reimbursement system for filing costs is attractive only under a very constrained and unrealistic set of assumptions.”

  • Bush-Cheney Tax Returns and Athenian Democracy

    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    David Cay Johnston has a nice piece today in the NY Times on how the 2003 Bush and Cheney tax returns “demonstrate how far American tax policy has veered from two classic philosophical insights about how to finance government: ‘horizontal equity’ and ‘vertical equity.’” In her article, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, Maureen Cavanaugh (Washington & Lee) observed that “Athenian democracy, with its complete commitment to political equality, allocated its tax burden to the wealthy and exempted ordinary citizens from tax, an exemption largely responsible for incorporation of ordinary (i.e., non-wealthy) citizens in democratic government.” In the NY Times piece, Cavanaugh notes that the Bush-Cheney tax returns reflect a shift away from the ability-to-pay ideal. Johnston concludes that “One thing’s for sure: Judging from the Cheney and Bush returns, we’ve come a long way indeed from the classic tax policies of ancient Greece.”

  • IRS Says “Bling Bling” Not Deductible

    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    The Watley Review, which describes itself as being “dedicated to the production of articles completely without journalistic merit or factual basis,” reports in its latest issue that the IRS will not allow taxpayers to deduct the cost of “bling bling” — diamonds, jewelry, and related showy paraphernelia.

  • Top 5 Tax Paper Downloads

    Sunday, April 18, 2004

    The Social Science Research Network compiles a list of the most frequently downloaded tax papers over a rolling two-month period. Here are the Top 5 tax downloads from this week’s Top 10 list:

    1. Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, by Reuven Avi-Yonah (Michigan)

    2. The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, by Steven Bank (UCLA)

    3. Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for Reform by David Schizer (Columbia)

    4. The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, by Michael Knoll (Pennsylvania)

    5. The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited by Steven Bank (UCLA)

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