This week, Doron Narotski (Akron) reviews Susan C. Morse (Texas), Shu-Yi Oei (Duke) & Diane Ring (Boston College), The Origination Clause And The President’s Tariffs:

Amid the constitutional storm surrounding President Trump’s sweeping 2025 tariffs, and with the Supreme Court set to hear the consolidated Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump matters, the authors offer a highly relevant framework that explains how Article I’s Taxing Power Clause and the Origination Clause provide a structure and analysis of executive tariff authority, and although I am especially interested in the subject of tariffs, perhaps more than most tax scholars, I found the Article extremely valuable and beneficial for clarifying contested doctrines and guiding courts and policymakers evaluating executive tariff authority.

The Article’s central claim is clear and fascinating. The Origination Clause does not provide a direct constitutional limit on delegations to the Executive, yet it provides a strong guide for statutory interpretation. Used as an interpretive tool, it helps courts separate true revenue measures from regulatory statutes that incidentally raise revenue. Applied to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the framework leads to a clear result: IEEPA does not authorize broad, general tariffs like the 2025 across the board and reciprocal rates.

The authors begin by situating the 2025 tariffs and the litigation brought the issue to the Supreme Court. The Executive cited several delegations, including Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Section 301 of the Trade Act, and IEEPA. The Article clearly identifies how courts have treated these sources and why the IEEPA became the focal point. Furthermore, instead of reaching for the nondelegation doctrine or the Major Questions Doctrine, the Article urges courts to resolve this issue with ordinary statutory tools guided by Origination Clause principles, which is important because it narrows the inquiry to text, structure, and institutional practice, and avoids disruption in trade and foreign affairs law. Perhaps even allowing the courts a path to bring some order and stability to a chaotic situation.

Part II provides the historical and institutional background. The Origination Clause emerged from the constitutional settlement that placed initiation of revenue bills in the House of Representatives. The House has long enforced that prerogative through the blue slip process, through the Ways and Means committee gatekeeping, and through other procedural tools. Courts have been reluctant to resolve origination disputes directly, which means the Clause has shaped legislative practice more than it has generated controlling doctrine. The authors use this history to make an important point. If the Clause does most of its work inside Congress, courts should be cautious about inventing new constitutional tests and should instead read statutes with an eye to whether Congress acted as it usually does when it raises revenue.

Part III addresses direct constitutional limits and explains why those are unlikely to constrain the 2025 tariffs. First, a classic origination challenge will not succeed where the underlying statute originated in the House. Second, the Article argues that recent doctrine does not support a special, stricter nondelegation rule for taxes. The Supreme Court has continued to apply the ordinary intelligible‑principle standard and has declined to create a tax‑specific variant. The authors close one common path through which litigants try to resist revenue‑related delegations by showing that a constitutional rule that singles out taxes for heightened scrutiny lacks doctrinal traction. This does not make Article I weak. It means the Clause does its most reliable work as an interpretive guide, directing courts to close reading of statutory text and to institutional context.

Part IV is the heart of the Article. The authors offer a two‑step revenue classification framework derived from Origination Clause case law. First, ask whether the statute is a bill for raising revenue. That turns on purpose and destination of funds. Measures that raise money for the general Treasury are revenue statutes. Measures that impose assessments to fund a particular program, or to regulate conduct with incidental receipts, are not. Second, look for institutional indicia that Congress treated the law as a revenue bill. Committee provenance, budget scoring, and procedural markers are all signals. The strength of this framework is that it is grounded in text, history, and practice. It does not rely on broad purpose claims. It asks for concrete features that can be identified in statutory language and legislative process.

The IEEPA application follows naturally. IEEPA allows the President to regulate importation upon a finding of an unusual or extraordinary threat. It does not mention duties, tariffs, or taxes. It did not proceed through the revenue committees. It does not carry the normal scoring and procedural markers of a tax statute. On the Article’s test, IEEPA looks like a regulatory emergency law, not a bill for raising revenue. That conclusion matters because the 2025 tariffs are projected to raise large sums for the general fund, and they operate like a general revenue device rather than a targeted countermeasure. The authors’ reading preserves the President’s flexibility to use IEEPA for time‑limited, problem‑specific trade controls, while insisting that long‑term, general‑fund revenue policies require clear textual delegation and the institutional pathways that Congress uses when it raises money.

The Article also explains why courts do not need to rest their analysis on the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD). The MQD, instructs courts to look for clear statements when an agency asserts authority with vast economic and political significance. The tariffs would qualify under that rubric. Yet the authors show that ordinary statutory interpretation, informed by the Origination Clause taxonomy, resolves the delegation question without invoking MQD at all. That approach has two benefits. It reduces the risk of unintended effects in foreign affairs and trade administration, and it aligns with the Court’s stated preference to resolve cases on narrower grounds when possible.

A second strength is the Article’s treatment of institutional practice. The discussion of House enforcement is not mere background. It explains why the Clause rarely produces direct constitutional holdings and why interpretive canons grounded in the Clause are the right tool for courts. The account of how revenue bills usually move through Congress gives judges a practical lens. If a statute delegates revenue power, one expects to see familiar markers. If those markers are missing, courts should hesitate before reading a general emergency statute to authorize permanent, general‑fund taxation at scale.

A third contribution is the doctrinal synthesis that closes the door on a special nondelegation rule for taxes. The Article reads the modern cases to confirm that delegations that affect revenue are still judged under the ordinary standard. That has two consequences. It reduces the value of constitutional attacks that rely on the Origination Clause to create stronger nondelegation rules. It also raises the relative importance of thoughtful statutory reading guided by Origination Clause principles. The path the authors chart is narrow, but it is durable. It does not depend on broad shifts in the Court’s separation‑of‑powers doctrine.

The Article is also careful in treating counterarguments. On foreign affairs, the authors acknowledge the concern that courts should not micromanage the tools the Executive uses to address emergencies. Their answer is straightforward. The Article does not deny that the President can regulate imports under IEEPA within its terms. It argues that taxes and permanent revenue measures are different in kind. If Congress wants to delegate that power, it knows how to do so, and when it does, it uses procedures and language that unmistakably reflect a revenue choice. On emergency duration, the Article draws a line between temporary measures that mitigate a specific threat and permanent across‑the‑board rates that function as general revenue policy. Courts can respect both the need for executive agility and the constitutional allocation of taxing power by insisting on clear delegations for the latter.

The Article concludes that such presidentially initiated tariffs constitute an unprecedented use of executive authority in U.S. tax law and are in tension with Article I’s Origination Clause and Taxing Power Clause, which vest the taxing power in Congress rather than in the President. I agree, and I would add, as I have argued elsewhere, that treating tariffs as a standing revenue tool invites a slippery slope in which the Executive circumvents congressional control of taxation, weakening accountability and the constitutional structure that guards fiscal power.

Overall, this is an excellent Article with a precise thesis that fits the moment. It restores the Origination Clause to its best use in adjudication and gives courts a way to police the boundary between revenue and regulation without rewriting separation‑of‑powers doctrine. Furthermore, the Article offers an IEEPA analysis that is narrow, text‑based, and institutionally aware. The result is a persuasive case for invalidating the 2025 general‑fund tariffs under IEEPA while preserving necessary executive flexibility in real emergencies. For litigators, tax scholars, and constitutionalists, this is essential reading.

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