This week, Assaf Harpaz (Georgia; Google Scholar) reviews a new work by Joshua D. Blank (UC Irvine; Google Scholar) and Ari Glogower (Northwestern; Google Scholar), Rethinking Taxpayer Purpose, 53 J. Legis. __ (forthcoming 2027).
Like torts and criminal law, tax law often considers the taxpayer’s purpose. How should we think about these purpose-based rules? Do they benefit certain taxpayers more than others, and should some be reformed to better fulfill their functions? In Rethinking Taxpayer Purpose, Joshua Blank and Ari Glogower explore the downsides of purpose requirements in tax law. The authors compellingly show how wealthy taxpayers can routinely manipulate purpose rules, and offer several paths for reforming them.
The Article begins by providing a comprehensive overview of purpose-based rules in U.S. tax law and examines their varying structures and functions. This part surveys anti-abuse rules that look to the taxpayer’s purpose for entering the transaction, like the Section 531 accumulated earnings tax, and the economic substance doctrine codified by Congress in 2010 under Section 7701(o)(1). It also examines civil tax penalties that depend on the taxpayer’s intent at the time they conducted the activity subject to penalty, like the Section 6662 accuracy-related penalty for underpayments of tax.
The Article then turns to describing the problems associated with using purpose requirements as design features of tax rules. The fundamental problem is that a rule that depends solely on a taxpayer’s intent does not necessarily require the taxpayer to engage in any economic activity or behavioral changes. The authors posit that this type of requirement reverses the basic principle that the determination of tax liabilities should hinge on a taxpayer’s economic activities. Moreover, a taxpayer’s subjective intent cannot be known with certainty and must instead be inferred from their external statements and conduct.
The authors explain that identifying the taxpayer’s intent can be difficult, if not impossible. Taxpayers can manipulate purpose-based requirements by documenting at least one significant non-tax avoidance motivation for engaging in a transaction, even if they ultimately intend to reduce their tax liability. In addition, because taxpayer purpose is inherently prospective, the law does not require taxpayers to actually achieve their stated purpose. And because taxpayers often do not publicly disclose their purposes without an audit or litigation, the lack of adequate enforcement resources by the Internal Revenue Service constrains the ability to identify the validity of taxpayer purpose. In this context, the authors note the extensive scholarly critique of the Frank Lyon Co. decision, where the taxpayer successfully convinced the court that the transaction was motivated by a genuine non-tax business purpose, and not exclusively tax avoidance. As part of this discussion, the authors may also be interested in a recent paper by Professors Kim and Erokhin that uses machine learning to evaluate the multifactor test for determining tax ownership established in Frank Lyon.
This Article proceeds by arguing that the problems with purpose requirements are exacerbated by taxpayers’ wealth or income. Put simply, wealthy individuals and business taxpayers have greater opportunities to manufacture the requisite intent of ineffective purpose requirements. Many of the subjective, purpose-based requirements in the Code are only relevant to the transactions and strategies of wealthy and business taxpayers in the first place. In contrast, the types of transactions ordinary taxpayers conduct are more often evaluated through objective, rather than subjective, metrics. Furthermore, wealthy taxpayers have the capacity to employ sophisticated tax advisors who can assist in manipulating purpose-based rules to obtain tax benefits or avoid anti-abuse rules. Here, the authors may wish to elaborate on two related points. First, whether subjective standards are inherently more susceptible to manipulation than objective ones, given that taxpayers can also structure transactions to satisfy objective metrics while circumventing their underlying purposes. Second, whether the ability to retain sophisticated tax counsel provides wealthy and business taxpayers with similar opportunities to exploit the Code’s many objective standards, simply given their superior economic position.
The Article concludes by proposing three potential reforms. First, that certain subjective purpose requirements should be eliminated in favor of objective standards that focus on taxpayers’ actual economic behavior. The authors provide examples of tax-deferred corporate separations and the subjective prong of the codified economic substance doctrine as places where purpose should be removed. Second, the authors propose supplementing purpose-based requirements with objective lookback provisions that evaluate whether taxpayers’ subsequent conduct is consistent with their stated purposes. The most notable example is the accumulated earnings tax, and Congress can draw on other areas of the tax law that utilize lookback provisions that consider the objective outcomes of a taxpayer’s behavior in other taxable years. Lastly, the authors suggest strengthening inquiries into taxpayers’ actual subjective intent by limiting or eliminating exceptions that allow taxpayers to avoid such scrutiny (e.g., through the reliance on professional advice defense to civil tax penalties). Specifically, the authors argue that policymakers should reconsider the design of the reasonable cause and good faith exception, possibly removing it as a whole for high-income taxpayers.
In summary, this excellent and thought-provoking Article makes several important contributions to the tax law literature. One of its greatest strengths is that it invites the reader to think about purpose requirements as a broader conceptual feature of tax law, rather than as distinct rules that we might otherwise consider in isolation. The authors also make a compelling case for reconsidering the role of purpose requirements in tax law, and offer concrete paths forward for reforming them.
Here is the rest of this week’s SSRN tax roundup:
Martin Altenburger (retria ESG), Harald Amberger (WU Vienna, Inst. for Acct. & Auditing) & Karina Sopp (Tech. U. Bergakademie Freiberg), The Effect of Information Sharing (with the Tax Authority) on Tax Compliance, J. Int’l Acct., Auditing & Tax’n (forthcoming)
Joshua D. Blank (UC Irvine) & Ari Glogower (Northwestern), Rethinking Taxpayer Purpose, 53 J. Legis. (forthcoming 2027)
Thomas J. Brennan (Harvard) & David M. Schizer (Columbia), “Big Picture” Investing at Nonprofits: Accounting for Future Expenses and Donations, 33 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 279 (2026)
Murillo Campello (Florida, Brigham Dep’t of Fin., Ins. & Real Est.) & Guilherme Junqueira (Florida, Brigham Dep’t of Fin., Ins. & Real Est.), Democratizing Venture Capital: Tax Incentives and the Geographic Expansion of Startup Investing (Sep. 27, 2026)
Roger Colinvaux (Catholic), Comment of Professor Roger Colinvaux to Proposed Regulations, Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools, REG-119986-25, RIN 1545-BS05, 91 Fed. Reg. 56,811 (Sept. 4, 2026) (Nov. 2, 2026)
Jeffrey A. Cooper (Quinnipiac), Stumbling Toward Oblivion: Fiscal Federalism and the State Death Tax Credit, 45 Va. Tax Rev. 287 (2026)
Hilary Damissah (Independent), Examining the Effects of Media Analyses, Editorials and Commentaries on Government Policies in Nigeria’s Democratic System: A Critical Review (Nov. 9, 2026)
Sergey Demyanov (Independent), Assessment Without Appraisal (Nov. 9, 2026)
Sergey Demyanov (Independent), Valuation by Open Refusal (Nov. 9, 2026)
David Elkins (Netanya) & Christopher H. Hanna (SMU), Unlocking the Mystery of Private Equity: A New Tax Paradigm, 29 Fla. Tax Rev. 602 (2026)
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. (BYU), Robert J. Peroni (Texas) & Stephen E. Shay (Boston College), The United States as a Tax Cut Competitor in a Time of Large Deficits, 193 Tax Notes Fed. 547 (Oct. 19, 2026), 124 Tax Notes Int’l 533 (Oct. 19, 2026)
Guilherme Nunes Guimarães (Pontifical Catholic U. Rio Grande do Sul), Tax Neutrality vs. Revenue Collection Efficiency: The Conflict Between the Non-Cumulativity Principle and the Conditioned Tax Credit Mechanism in Brazil’s Consumption Tax Reform (May 31, 2026)
Philip Hackney (Pittsburgh) & Ellen P. Aprill (UCLA), Comments on Proposed Regulations, Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools, IRS REG-119986-25, 91 Fed. Reg. 56,811 (Sep. 4, 2026) (“NPRM”), U. Pitt. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 2026-32 (Nov. 4, 2026)
Kho Feng Ming (Azmi & Assocs.), The Tax Incentive Illusion? Valuing Malaysian Investment Incentives in Cross-Border M&A Under Pillar Two (Oct. 21, 2026)
Kenneth Kocon, The Priced Out: How America Turned Housing into a Wealth Transfer and Called It a Market (Nov. 12, 2026)
Błażej Kuźniacki (Lazarski U.), Neutralizing EU Anti-Hybrid Rules Through Third-Country Tax Treaties, 124 Tax Notes Int’l 921 (Nov. 2, 2026)
Ifeanyichukwu Mezu (ALN Nigeria, Aluko & Oyebode), A Critical Review of and Argument Against the Decision of the Tax Appeal Tribunal in Oando Oil Limited v. Federal Inland Revenue Service (Aug. 30, 2026)
Kelly-Brown Ochieng Odhiambo (Brian Otieno & Co. Advocs.), The Insolvency of Legal Grammar: Why International Tax Law Cannot Process the Digital Network (Oct. 12, 2026)
Milan Perazich (Independent), The Oil Tonne: How the 45Q Credit Came to Pay Storage Rates for CO2 the Public Cannot Check (Nov. 13, 2026)
Milan Perazich (Independent), Verification Architecture and the Displacement of Public Reporting in the United States Carbon Storage Credit (Nov. 9, 2026)
Milan Perazich (Independent), Who Absorbs the Shortfall? Derisking and the Selection of Conditions in North American Carbon Capture Subsidies (Nov. 9, 2026)
Milan Perazich (Independent), Who Publishes the Tonnes? Section 6103, Treasury Authority, and Public Accountability for Carbon Storage Credits (Nov. 9, 2026)
João Félix Pinto Nogueira (IBFD) & Pedro Schoueri (IBFD), eds., Ability to Pay in Tax Law, IBFD (2026)
João Félix Pinto Nogueira (IBFD), Portugal: Utiledulci (C-545/24), Meritpanorama and Others (C-661/25) and Neckar-FundMaster 1 (C-314/26) (Nov. 10, 2026)
Asad Ramzanali (Vanderbilt Pol’y Accelerator), 34 Ways to Tax AI (Oct. 22, 2026)
Annemarie Reindl, Trade Tax Add-Backs for Digital Business Models: SaaS, Cloud Infrastructure, and Platform Services—On Distinguishing Between the Transfer of Rights, the Provision of Tangible Capital Assets, and Services Under Section 8 No. 1 GewStG (Nov. 13, 2026)
Rosalia Rosal (U. Santo Tomas), KAPI Insurance Fraud and KAPA Investment Scam: Chronology of Faith-Based Wealth Transfer in the Philippines (Nov. 8, 2026)
Chris William Sanchirico (Penn) & Reed Shuldiner (Penn), Circular Partnerships: Pinpointing the Problems, Proposing Solutions, 193 Tax Notes Fed. 677 (Oct. 26, 2026)
Bret Wells (Houston) & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah (Michigan), Textualism, Absurd Anomalies, and Tax Logic (Nov. 9, 2026)



